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6 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTEGRATION
AT THE NONELITE CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTEGRATION

AT THE NONELITE CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

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INTRODUCTION

→ The nature of civilian-military linkages and their implications for civilian control of the military is an enduring research and policy issue. The advent of the all-volunteer force has resulted in a generally renewed focus on this issue¹ as reflected in a recent paper by Segal, Senter and Segal.² Their study addressed the question of how well the military is woven into the fabric of society. They focused on the structural linkages between a cross-section of the civilian population and the military institution and examined the implications of such linkages for civilian control of the military. This paper will examine the general issue of the integration of the military into society but will extend existing analyses by also looking at the structural linkages between a representative sample of Army personnel and civilian society. In addition, the implications of these linkages for the internal integration of soldiers into the military organization as well as for their external integration into American society will be examined.

In the ongoing policy debate over the transition to an all-volunteer force, one major concern is whether voluntary conditions will lead to an increasingly isolated military. It has been hypothesized that the military's boundaries are becoming less and less permeable, resulting in less civil-military contact and, consequently, less impact from civilian norms and sensibilities.³ Career military men have, for example, been found to hold ideological views that are increasingly distinct from their civilian counterparts.⁴

↖ The relationship between military personnel and civilians has

received considerable attention in the literature on armed forces and society. Most of this has focused on the study of networks of elites and the "military-industrial complex." The emphasis of this literature has been on the closeness of ties between military and civilian elites or defense contractors and government officials, and most discussions have regarded civil-military contact of this kind as dysfunctional or harmful.⁵ Some scholars have even argued that such ties should be minimized, i.e., they have argued for isolation of the military.⁶ Others have insisted that civil-military contact should be increased.⁷

While the relationship between military elites and civilian elites has been quite thoroughly considered, much less is known about the relationship between nonelite personnel and civilian society. For example, research has not focused on attempts to measure the interpersonal ties of nonelite military personnel to nonelite civilians, nor have the empirical consequences of interpersonal ties (or the lack of such ties) between the nonelite military and civilians been established, although the extent and consequences of interpersonal ties between nonelite civilians and military personnel have been recently researched.⁸

Those who favor increased military isolation expect increased contact with civilians to have negative consequences and to result in excessive civilianization, including an increase in the infection of the military, for example, by civilian based drug abuse and racism.⁹ On the other hand, those who argue for increased civil-military contact see this as an important aspect of institution building and the maintenance of civilian sensibilities and values

among military personnel.

This paper will not try to address all the possible consequences (positive or negative) of civil-military contact at the nonelite level, but will focus on (a) the extent of such contact and (b) the impact of variations in contact on the values of a cross-section of military personnel. From a theoretical perspective, levels of civil-military contact are seen here as indicative of levels of integration external to the military system on the part of military personnel. In this paper, an attempt will be made to assess empirically the relative importance, for soldiers' values, of these factors of external integration compared to those factors that increase their level of integration internal to the military system. However, prior to undertaking this examination of external integration and its relative importance, it is necessary to consider the broader issue of civil-military convergence.

THE TWO FACES OF CONVERGENCE

The theoretical and policy issues raised above reflect the long-term concern of students of armed forces and society about the convergence or divergence of civilian and military sectors of American society.¹⁰ Recent work has pointed to two different but interrelated aspects of the issue of convergence. The first refers to similarities in civilian and military social structures such as occupational distributions, family life, and organizational procedures. The second focuses on the extent of civil-military interdependence or integration.¹¹

In terms of nonelite soldiers, the issue of social similarity of

soldiers to civilians has led to concern about social representation in terms of race, social class, sex and ideology.¹² On the other hand, growing social similarity of a potentially harmful nature for the military organization has been addressed in the current debate over whether the transition to an All-Volunteer Force has resulted in the development of an occupational model of the military as distinct from the traditional institutional model (or the change of military service from a calling to a job).¹³

However, there has been less attention directed toward the problem of civil-military integration. The research that does exist among civilians, for example, has found low levels of contact with military personnel, especially those currently in the military.¹⁴

CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTEGRATION MECHANISMS

To look at the linkages of military men with civilians, and civilian society generally, is to implicitly compare them with other kinds of mechanisms that link soldiers instead to the military organization itself. For soldiers, the linkages to civilian society can be thought of as external integration mechanisms and the linkages to the military organization as internal integration mechanisms. Past research with the data set used here has focused on soldiers and their relationships to the military organization.¹⁵ If, however, their integration internal to the organization is regarded as only one kind of integration and, more importantly, if the analytic focus shifts to a comparison of the mechanisms that facilitate internal integration with those that have consequences for external

integration, then one can begin to more systematically evaluate the nature of the civil-military interface for these rank and file soldiers.

Past research with these data has identified two major mechanisms for integrating soldiers into the military system.¹⁶ They are organizational position (as reflected in the soldier's rank) and commitment to the organization (as reflected in career orientation). Both of these integrating factors are seen here as mechanisms that have consequences for a soldier's values.

Alternatively, there are two major mechanisms for external integration that have been suggested in the literature. They are civilian friendship networks (as reflected in the number of civilian versus military friends) and residence outside the organizational boundaries (as reflected in off-post housing). Janowitz has argued for these interpersonal contacts as a critical part of institution building for the American military.¹⁷ Segal and his colleagues have pointed to the proportion of military personnel living off-post as a potentially important indicator of the level of civil-military interdependence.¹⁸ These mechanisms can be thought of as potentially critical linkages of nonelite personnel to the broader social system. The question remains, however, whether there are any demonstrable consequences of these linkages.

In their analysis of the civil-military interface among civilians, Segal, Senter, and Segal not only looked at the extent of civilian linkages with the military, but also at the consequences of those linkages for civilian values.¹⁹ In a complementary fashion, this analysis will look at mechanisms integrating military personnel

with civilian society and the consequences of those integrating mechanisms for the level of certain values among soldiers. The values to be examined are soldiers' evaluations of (a) the relationship of the organization to themselves as organizational members - an internal evaluation - and (b) an evaluation of the relationship of the organization and its leaders to the society and its leaders - an external evaluation.

INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY-ORIENTED EVALUATIONS

Service in a social institution extends beyond altruism and self sacrifice to the search by individuals for a satisfying occupation and by professional groups for autonomy. With regard to the latter issue, there has been considerable disagreement concerning the consequences of professionalization for the military's political neutrality and willingness to submit to civilian control. Huntington argued that professionalization would lead to professional detachment from politics and contribute to civilian control over the military through the internalization of "professional" values by military men.²⁰

Janowitz saw such internal control mechanisms as inadequate and contended that they must be supplemented by powerful external constraints imposed by the executive, congressional, and judicial branches of government as well as by the development of interpersonal linkages between military personnel and civilians.²¹ Abrahamsson argued that the process of professionalization leads inevitably to the development of a corporate interest group which will seek to increase its professional autonomy and expand its political

role.²² Specifically he hypothesized that the internalization of norms restricting the military's political role, as hypothesized by Huntington, would be exactly the opposite of what one should expect the process of professionalization to produce.

One can conceptualize one's organizational satisfaction and one's evaluation of the adequacy of military influence along a similar dimension of how well perceptions of the actual situation meet preferences for the ideal situation. Organizational satisfaction, however, refers to the internal relationship of the organization to the individual, i.e., does the organization meet the individual's expectations in terms of various aspects of the work setting - the work group, the supervisor, the job itself, pay, progress in the work organization, etc. The implied comparison of perceptions and preferences results in levels of satisfaction from very dissatisfied to very satisfied.

For soldiers there can also be an assessment of the external relationship of the organization to the society. Does the society provide the organization with the expected amount of professional autonomy in terms of the amount of influence the organizational leaders have (compared to civilian leaders) in making decisions relevant to their professional domain in the management of mass violence, e.g., battlefield tactics, choice of new weapons systems, level of pay and benefits, use of nuclear weapons, and involvement in foreign conflicts?

Specifically, when one compares the soldier's perception of how much influence military leaders have with how much the soldier would

like them to have, one arrives at the soldier's assessment of the adequacy of the military profession's autonomy within society. This evaluation of "adequacy" is comparable to a level of "satisfaction" but the focus of analysis has shifted from the individual vis-a-vis the organization to the profession vis-a-vis the society.

With organizational satisfaction, one is assessing the fit of the organization to the individual; in the case of adequacy of military influence, one is evaluating the fit of the society to the organization. On one hand, does the organization meet the individual's needs or striving for a satisfying occupation? On the other hand, does the society meet the organization's or profession's search for an adequate level of autonomy? In each case, one is asking the respondent to assess this fit.

INTERNAL INTEGRATION, EXTERNAL INTEGRATION, AND SOLDIERS' EVALUATIONS

Our concern here with the extent of external integration of soldiers and the resulting consequences, if any, for soldiers' values implies a particular model of the relationships among the variables under consideration. Levels of external integration are seen as resulting, at least in part, from levels of internal integration, i.e., the location of one's residence and the makeup of one's circle of best friends are determined to a considerable extent by the rank one holds and the commitment (or lack of it) one has made to a career in the military. Furthermore, levels of both internal and external integration are expected to have consequences for soldiers' values. Finally, the nature of these relationships between integration (internal and external) and evaluations is expected to be different

if the evaluation is internally-oriented or externally-oriented.


These relationships are expressed in the heuristic model presented in Figure 1. The expected relationship between internal and external integration is expected to be negative, i.e., the more one is internally integrated into the military system, the more isolated one is expected to be from the broader society. This implies, of course, that the more aggregate levels of internal integration within the military, (e.g., the higher the proportion of career-oriented soldiers), the lower the levels of external integration and the less permeable the boundaries of the military system to external influences and the less interdependent the civil-military interface.

The model also presents the fundamental hypotheses with relation to the consequences of these integrative mechanisms for soldiers' evaluations: those who are most internally integrated are expected to be most satisfied with their own relationships to the organization but most dissatisfied with the relationship of society and its civilian leadership to their organization, at least with regard to who makes crucial decisions concerning national security policy.

The measure of the respondent's evaluation of the adequacy of military (versus civilian) influence is somewhat unusual. Prior research with this variable indicates that those who were generally most favorable toward the military in other areas were also most likely to perceive current levels of military influence as inadequate compared with their preferences.²³ Although the doctrine of civilian control of the military underlies the military as a social institution, dissatisfaction with the level of existing control is

FIGURE 1

HEURISTIC MODEL OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
INTEGRATION AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNALLY AND
EXTERNALLY-ORIENTED SATISFACTIONS



essentially a pro-military response. Thus, the relationship between organizational satisfaction (as an indicator of internally-oriented evaluation) and adequacy of military influence (as an indicator of externally-oriented evaluation) is expected to be negative. Because of this negative relationship, those who have the highest level of internal integration are expected to be most satisfied with the organization but most dissatisfied with the level of military influence.

The consequences of higher levels of external integration, on the other hand, are hypothesized to be in the opposite direction. That is, the more externally integrated the soldier is, the more likely he is expected to be lower in organizational satisfaction but to be more satisfied with the existing levels of civilian control over the national security decision-making process.

In the sections to follow, I will discuss the measurement of the indicators of internal and external integration and of internally and externally-oriented evaluations. Then, I will examine the levels of internal and external integration, i.e., of soldiers with their social environment, and will discuss variation in the external linkages. Finally, I will compare factors of external integration with factors of internal integration in terms of their effects on individual soldiers' values.

DATA SOURCES AND INDICATORS

The findings are based on survey questionnaires administered to a sample of 2286 Army personnel in late 1974 and early 1975, stratified to represent major Army entities. The data were collected

by the Institute for Social Research (ISR) of the University of Michigan. Because of the small numbers of women in the Army sample, they have not been included in the findings presented. The sample is described in greater detail in a recent volume which reports a wide variety of findings based on that data set.²⁴

Measures of Internal Integration

The two indicators of levels of internal integration that I have used here are career-orientation and rank. In this analysis I have looked at both the general status division between officers and enlisted men and also at a more differentiated status ranking within rank groups based on the respondent's pay grade. Pay grades in this sample range from E-1 to E-9 (or Private to Sergeant Major) for enlisted men and from O-1 to O-6 (or Second Lieutenant to Colonel) for officers. In most analyses to be presented below, respondents have been placed in one of five rank groups: Junior enlisted men (E1-E4), Junior noncommissioned officers or NCOs (E5-E6), and Senior NCOs (E7-E9), Junior officers (O1-O3) and Senior officers (O4-O6).

In this analysis I have treated as career-oriented those who planned to retire after this enlistment or to reenlist and make the military a career, plus those who planned to reenlist or extend but were undecided about a military career. I have treated as noncareer-oriented those who planned to return to civilian life, plus those who expected to reenlist or extend but did not intend to make the military a career. In most of the following analyses, a compound variable based on both career-orientation and rank and which has eight categories has been used. (There were too few noncareer Senior

NCOs and Senior officers to be included in the analysis.)

This breakdown by rank and career-orientation has been demonstrated in other analyses of data to reveal the fundamental cleavages among military men in terms of their preferences, perceptions and values and to have statistical effects independent of any background characteristics of the respondents.²⁵

Measures of External Integration

The two indicators of levels of external integration to be examined here are the number of civilian friends and off-post or on-post residence. To measure the first, number of civilian friends, a standard type of question concerning a fundamental social relationship (friendship) was used.²⁶ Each respondent was asked, "Think of the three adults who are your best friends. Do not include your parents, spouse, brothers, or sisters. How many of these people are in the military or are dependents of military personnel?" The number of civilian friends then is not an absolute total of all friends, but the number of those who were not in the military nor military dependents among the respondent's three best adult friends. Hence for this analysis a respondent can have from 0 to 3 civilian friends.

To ascertain whether the respondent's residence patterns were internal or external to the military system's boundaries, he was asked "In which kind of housing have you lived the most while in the Army?" Those who responded that they had lived mostly off-post were considered to have the highest level of external integration. The location of the respondent's usual residence was classified as

off-post, on-post: family housing, or on-post: institutional (barracks, bachelor enlisted quarters, or bachelor officer quarters).

Measures of Internally and Externally-Oriented Evaluation

The index of an internally-oriented evaluation is called here "organizational satisfaction" and was developed by Taylor and Bowers in the Survey of Organizations.²⁷ This index is typical of those commonly used to measure the extent of positive orientation of workers to their organization as expressed in terms of job satisfaction.²⁸ Job satisfaction and the quality of work life are of growing concern to students of the military, as well.²⁹

The measure used here reflects general satisfaction with the organizational work setting. It is an index made up of seven items measuring satisfaction with: "the persons in your work group," "your supervisor," "your job," "this organization compared to most of others," "your pay," "the progress you have made in this organization up to now," and "your chances for getting ahead in this organization in the future." Response categories ranged from "very dissatisfied" (scored 1) through "neither satisfied or dissatisfied" (3) to "very satisfied" (5).

The index of an externally-oriented evaluation is entitled "adequacy of military (versus civilian) influence." It is of particular relevance to this paper because of the emphasis above on the issue of professional autonomy and its consequences for the acceptance of civilian control. Respondents were asked to rate amounts of military versus civilian influence in each of five areas: U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts, battlefield tactics, choice of

new weapon systems, military pay levels, and use of nuclear weapons. For each area, respondents gave two ratings: a perception of present conditions ("this is how I think it is now"), and a preference ("this is how I'd like it to be"). Response categories range from "civilian leaders much more influence" (scored 1) through "about equal influence" (3) to "military leaders much more influence" (5). The perceived military (versus civilian) influence is based on the five ratings of "...how I think it is now." Preferred military (versus civilian) influence is based on the five ratings of "...how I'd like it to be." The index used here is based on the discrepancy between perceived and preferred influence.

If the perceived level of influence is equal to what is preferred, then military influence would be adequate. If perception is greater than preference, then military influence is considered to be excessive. If a respondent, however, prefers more military influence than he perceives actually exists, then his adequacy score is low. As indicated above, past research by Bachman, Blair, and Segal³⁰ shows that the more favorable someone felt toward the military in general, the more likely he was to rate the actual amounts of influence by military (versus civilian) leaders as rather low and the amount he would like to see as moderate or high. It follows, then, that those most favorable toward the military tended to see the current levels of military influence as inadequate, i.e., the levels they perceived were lower than the levels they preferred.

FINDINGS

Extent of Internal and External Integration

Soldiers are generally split in terms of their overall levels of internal integration. For example, 48% of the respondents are junior enlisted men and 47% are noncareer-oriented and, thus, low in internal integration. These two aspects of internal integration are themselves interrelated. Among junior enlisted men, nearly three-quarters (73%) are not oriented to a military career, whereas only 28% of junior NCOs and virtually none of the senior NCOs are noncareer. Officers are even more likely to be career-oriented than enlisted men. Even among junior officers, 74% indicate that they are career-oriented, and almost all senior officers are career. Thus, in this study, noncareer junior enlisted men are seen as the lowest in levels of internal integration, reflecting both their position in the organizational hierarchy and their lack of commitment to long term involvement with that organization. Senior NCOs and senior officers are the most internally integrated because of their organizational positions and their levels of career commitment.

The soldiers in our sample are also quite evenly divided in terms of their levels of external integration. Slightly more than half (55%) have civilians as the majority (two or three) of their best friends and 38% live off-post. These two measures of external integration are also interrelated. Of those living off-post, 52% as opposed to only 32% of those in post family housing have civilians making up the majority of their friendship network. Contrary to expectation, 64% of those in institutional settings on-post indicate majority civilian friendships. A detailed discussion of this relationship between the two indicators of external integration will

appear below. Next we will examine in detail the variation in the extent of external integration which results from differing levels of internal integration.

Variation in the Extent of External Integration

Seventy-one percent of all noncareer enlisted soldiers indicated that 2 or 3 (the majority of their best friends) were civilian as contrasted with 43% of career-oriented enlisted personnel. Fifty-four percent of noncareer officers indicated that the majority of their best friends were civilians compared to the 34% who responded similarly among career officers. These findings illustrate both the effect of career-orientation and the effect of rank on the level of integration external to the military system in terms of friendship networks.

In Table 1, detailed findings are presented for the eight rank and career-orientation groups. The last row contains a useful summary measure reflecting a civilian "bias" in the respondent's friendship network. As seen in Table 1, there were also additional effects of increases in rank (pay grade), which reflect additional time in the service as well as increased organizational position, and which show the growing isolation from civilians in terms of close friendships. Also at each rank level, the differences continued between those who were career-oriented and those who were not. For example, among junior enlisted men fifty-eight percent of career as opposed to 72% of noncareer soldiers had the majority of their best friends as civilians. Among career soldiers who are junior NCOs, only 41% had mainly civilian best friends compared to 65% among

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF BEST FRIENDS WHO ARE CIVILIAN BY RANK AND CAREER ORIENTATION: PERCENTAGE SCORES

| | | <u>NONCAREER</u> | | | <u>CAREER</u> | | | | |
|--|--|------------------------|----------------|--------------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | Junior Enlisted Men | Junior NCOs | Junior Officers | Junior Enlisted Men | Junior NCOs | Senior NCOs | Junior Officers | Senior Officers |
| (N) | | (707) | (178) | (37) | (260) | (450) | (229) | (103) | (38) |
| <u>Number of Civilian Friends:</u> | | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| None | | 15 | 21 | 27 | 23 | 36 | 50 | 35 | 42 |
| One | | 13 | 14 | 19 | 20 | 22 | 17 | 25 | 42 |
| Two | | 20 | 20 | 30 | 19 | 15 | 12 | 26 | 13 |
| Three | | 52 | 45 | 24 | 39 | 26 | 20 | 14 | 3 |
| Total | | 100 | 100 | 100 | 101 | 99 | 99 | 100 | 100 |
| Majority of 3 Friends are Civilians (2+3): | | 72 | 65 | 54 | 58 | 41 | 12 | 40 | 16 |

noncareer junior NCOs. Indeed, the proportion goes as low as 32% (among career senior NCOs) who have majority civilian friendship networks. Among career officers, 40% of the junior officers indicate majority civilian friendship networks, but only 16% of senior officers report the same. These findings can be contrasted with the 54% for junior noncareer officers who report that most of their best friends are civilians.

In terms of the second measure of external linkage, 32% of noncareer enlisted soldiers indicated that they have lived off-post most while in the Army as contrasted with 40% of career-enlisted men. Forty-six percent of noncareer officers have spent most of their time living off-post but can be compared to the 53% of career officers who reported mostly off-post living. These findings show a different pattern than that for friendship networks, i.e., career personnel and officers are more likely than noncareer and enlisted personnel to live off-post. Some of this is the result of increasing privileges with rank, but much is also a reflection of marital status.

Indeed, on-post housing is quite different for low ranking, unmarried soldiers than for higher ranking, married soldiers. Thus, the nature of this external linkage is somewhat more complex than just on-post versus off-post. The locations of usual residence for the eight rank and career-orientation groups are presented in Table 2. There is generally little substantive difference in off-post living between career and noncareer soldiers of the same rank. If anything, noncareer soldiers are less likely to live off-post. The relationship to rank is also somewhat complex and somewhat curvilinear with both very junior enlisted men and more senior

TABLE 2

LOCATION OF USUAL RESIDENCE BY RANK AND CAREER ORIENTATION

| Location of Usual Residence: | <u>NONCAREER</u> | | | <u>CAREER</u> | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | <u>Junior Enlisted Men</u> | <u>Junior NCOs</u> | <u>Junior Officers</u> | <u>Junior Enlisted Men</u> | <u>Junior NCOs</u> | <u>Senior NCOs</u> | <u>Junior Officers</u> | <u>Senior Officers</u> |
| (N) | (719) | (179) | (37) | (261) | (451) | (227) | (102) | (38) |
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| On-Post: Institutional | 73 | 33 | 27 | 64 | 27 | 19 | 19 | 8 |
| On-Post: Family | 1 | 10 | 30 | 3 | 28 | 43 | 22 | 55 |
| Off-Post: | <u>26</u> | <u>57</u> | <u>43</u> | <u>33</u> | <u>45</u> | <u>37</u> | <u>59</u> | <u>37</u> |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 99 | 100 | 100 |

enlisted less likely to live off-post. Senior officers are also less likely to live off-post. This results from senior officers and NCOs being more likely to be married and eligible to live in family housing on-post. Junior enlisted men also are most likely to live on-post - but in institutional housing.

Although external integration is treated here as a unitary concept, there is a general causal ordering implied between the two indicators used. One's social networks are thought of as not only a consequence of one's level of internal integration but also of one's location in physical space - inside or outside the organizational boundaries of the military. Thus, personal ties to civilians or military personnel are also thought to result from whether or not one lives on-post or off-post. This assumption was explicit in the concern of Segal and his colleagues when they examined the growing proportions of families living on-post as an indicator of decreased civil-military interdependence resulting from taking growing proportions of families inside the military system's boundaries and thus isolating them from civilian contacts.³⁰ Hence, one would predict that living on-post would reduce the number of civilian friends one has, while living off-post would increase the civilian "bias" in one's friendship network. The empirical consequences of one's residence will be examined below.

Our final analysis of the extent of external linkages of military personnel with civilian society will focus exclusively on the number of civilian friends a soldier has. The number of civilian friends will be predicted not only by the measures of external integration (rank and career-orientation) but also by the location of

one's usual residence. In addition, potential demographic correlates of the number of civilian friends were examined, and three additional predictors will be added to the equation: age, education, and marital status of the respondent. Other possible demographic correlates such as race, region of origin, type of community of origin, parents' educations, and years in civilian employment showed little predictive strength and were not included in this analysis. Age, education and marital status were also of predictive value in the study of civilian linkages with the military conducted by Segal, Senter and Segal.³¹ In our military sample, these important sociological variables can also be thought of as potential proxy variables for career-orientation, rank and location of residence, as well, since they are related to the "military" variables under examination here.

In Table 3 the results of a multiple classification analysis are presented which included the four additional predictors in addition to the combined rank and career-orientation variable. The bivariate coefficients (etas) are presented as well as the multivariate coefficients (betas) which reflect the relative explanatory power of each variable taking the rest into account. Finally, the total percentage of explained variance in number of civilian friends is presented when it is predicted by all five predictors.

By squaring the eta for rank and career-orientation, one arrives at the percentage of variance explained (11.6%) by that combined variable of the total variance in the number of civilian friends. This is only one percent of explained variance less than results from including all five variables in the equation. The results in Table 3 seem to indicate that (a) contrary to expectation, location of usual

TABLE 3

MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF NUMBER OF CIVILIAN FRIENDS
BY RANK AND CAREER ORIENTATION (COMBINED), LOCATION OF USUAL
RESIDENCE, AGE, EDUCATION, AND MARITAL STATUS

| <u>Predictor:</u> | <u>eta</u> | <u>beta</u> |
|-----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Rank and Career Orientation | .34 | .30 |
| Location of Usual Residence | .23 | .07 |
| Age | .26 | .05 |
| Education | .15 | .06 |
| Marital Status | .22 | .08 |

Percentage of Variance Explained: 12.6%

residence does not seem to have much independent explanatory power with regard to friendship networks, and (b) age, education, and marital status provide little additional explanation in the variance of those friendships.

Internally and Externally-Oriented Evaluations

According to the model presented in Figure 1, a soldier's levels of internal and external evaluations should result from his levels of internal and external integration. Thus, the analyses to follow will again use multiple classification analysis to look at the relative explanatory power of the indicators of internal and external integration and, hence, their consequences for satisfaction.

Table 4 includes both the bivariate and multivariate coefficients resulting from predicting organizational satisfaction with rank and career-orientation and with number of civilian friends and location of usual residence. In multivariate as well as bivariate analyses, the two most important predictors are career orientation and rank (internal integration) although the beta for number of civilian friends does indicate some independent explanatory power. Although the mean scores are not presented here, the number of civilian friends is, as predicted, negatively related to organizational satisfaction. Those who lived off-post were shown to be intermediate in their satisfaction between those who lived in institutional on-post housing and those who lived in on-post family housing. Career orientation is the most important component of internal integration in predicting the level of satisfaction an individual soldier reports with his organization work setting.

TABLE 4

MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SATISFACTION
BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN FRIENDS, USUAL RESIDENCE, AND RANK AND
CAREER ORIENTATION

| <u>Predictor:</u> | <u>eta</u> | <u>beta</u> |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Number of Civilian Friends | .23 | .09 |
| Usual Residence | .23 | .04 |
| Rank | .36 | .19 |
| Career Orientation | .41 | .30 |

Percentage of Variance Explained: 20.8%

TABLE 5

MULTIPLE CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS OF ADEQUACY OF MILITARY
(VERSUS CIVILIAN) INFLUENCE BY NUMBER OF CIVILIAN FRIENDS,
USUAL RESIDENCE, AND RANK AND CAREER ORIENTATION

| <u>Predictor:</u> | <u>eta</u> | <u>beta</u> |
|----------------------------|------------|-------------|
| Number of Civilian Friends | .23 | .09 |
| Usual Residence | .26 | .03 |
| Rank | .46 | .36 |
| Career Orientation | .38 | .15 |

Percentage of Variance Explained: 24.2%

In Table 5 the same type of analysis is presented for the externally-oriented evaluation measure. Again, measures of internal integration are most important as predictors with the number of civilian friends retaining some modest dependent explanation with regard to the level of satisfaction a soldier feels with the amount of influence his organization has in the national security policy making arena. Here the actual rank level is more important than career-orientation for a soldier's rating of the adequacy of military influence. The overall explanatory power of the equation - reflecting mainly internal integration - was quite high with over one-fifth of the variance explained. Although not presented here, the number of civilian friends is, in fact, positively related to the level of satisfaction with military influence compared to civilian influence. Those who lived off-post were intermediate between those who lived in institutional housing on-post (least dissatisfied) and family housing on-post (most dissatisfied) in their assessment of adequacy.

To provide a clearer picture of the specific nature of the relationships reflected in the multiple classification analyses, Table 6 includes the mean scores for each of the eight combined rank and career-orientation groups. The differences in relative importance of rank versus career-orientation, for the two satisfaction measures which appeared in Tables 4 and 5, are reflected in the mean scores as well.

In addition, the footnotes contain additional information to help interpret the mean scores. Of particular note in the footnotes, in addition to the overall mean and standard deviation, are the range

TABLE 6

ORGANIZATIONAL SATISFACTION AND ADEQUACY OF MILITARY (VERSUS CIVILIAN)
INFLUENCE BY RANK AND CAREER ORIENTATION: MEAN SCORES

| | <u>NONCAREER</u> | | | <u>CAREER</u> | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| | <u>Junior Enlisted Men</u> | <u>Junior NCOs</u> | <u>Junior Officers</u> | <u>Junior Enlisted Men</u> | <u>Junior NCOs</u> | <u>Junior Officers</u> | <u>Senior Officers</u> |
| Organizational Satisfaction* | 2.83 | 2.99 | 3.61 | 3.47 | 3.56 | 3.81 | 3.90 |
| Adequacy of Military Influence** | 3.50 | 2.68 | 2.85 | 3.05 | 2.08 | 1.85 | 2.73 |

*PVE: 18.4% Grand Mean: 3.29 S.D.: .95 Range: 1-5 Scale Midpoint: 4

**PVE: 22.4% Grand Mean: 2.78 S.D.: 1.35 Range: 0-8 Scale Midpoint: 4

of possible scores on each scale and the midpoint of the range, e.g., 3 on a scale with a range of 1 to 5. The midpoint is treated here as representing a "neutral point," a position which does not seem especially favorable or unfavorable toward the military in terms of the value being measured. This midpoint is useful in locating the mean score with respect to the substantive range of the scale.

Career orientation and rank are shown in Table 1 to be important factors in soldiers' levels of satisfaction both internally and externally. In particular, career orientation is a very important source of variation. Among officers, although career-orientation is important, the distinctions are less marked than among enlisted men. The general pattern, however, is for career personnel to have higher mean scores than noncareer soldiers on the measure of organizational satisfaction and lower mean scores in their evaluation of the adequacy of military (versus civilian) influence. The relationship between the two indexes is negative as predicted in the model, but relatively modest ($r = -.19$) and reflects considerable independence of internal and external evaluations.

Career oriented soldiers see less adequacy of influence, i.e., are more dissatisfied with the level of professional autonomy realized by the leadership of the military as reflected in the influence of its leadership on national security decision making. Indeed, all career groups (and to a lesser extent all noncareer groups) express quite a high level of dissatisfaction in their assessment of military influence. Looking at the location of the mean scores with relation to the midpoint (4), no group sees the level of military influence as adequate (much less more than adequate

or excessive) although noncareer junior enlisted are the least dissatisfied. Other analyses of the specific questions that make up this index indicate that the primary source of this sense of the inadequacy of military influence results from the perceptions of very little influence by military leaders compared to civilian leaders rather than by preferences for overwhelming military influence.³²

One way of viewing the discrepancies between perceptions and preferences is to say that career men in the military tend to feel relatively powerless as a group over decisions that vitally affect their lives. They see decisions as being made mostly by civilians rather than by their own leaders. Looking at general organizational satisfaction, only junior noncareer enlisted men are below the midpoint. Senior career officers are particularly satisfied with the military organization, i.e., their mean score is almost an entire standard deviation above the midpoint.

The finding that career-orientation is more important than rank in understanding organizational satisfaction seems appropriate since commitment to a career in an organization probably implies considerable satisfaction with the job and its career-possibilities. On the other hand, rank is more critical in understanding the respondent's assessment of the adequacy of the military organization's influence of the leaders of the military organization. That relationship is more complex since higher ranking NCOs are more dissatisfied but higher ranking officers are less so. This latter finding may reflect some growing sophistication on the part of the most professionalized group - senior career officers-concerning the nature of civilian control. They are less dissatisfied than senior

NCOs but, nevertheless, more so than junior noncareer soldiers.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this paper was on the nature of the nonelite civil-military interface, the extent of external social integration among military personnel, and the consequences, if any, of that integration or lack of it for soldiers' internally and externally-oriented evaluations of the military system.

To summarize the findings, it is important to note that the measures of integration internal to the military organization (career-orientation and rank) were themselves strongly related to the measures of integration external to the military (number of civilian friends, and location of usual residence) although in different ways. Career-orientation and higher rank were negatively related to the number of civilian friends, but related in a more complex way to off-post residence.

The general patterns revealed in the analyses presented above are that measures of internal integration are generally more important in understanding soldiers' values than are measures of external integration. However, the number of civilian friends does have some quite consistent, but very modest, independent explanatory power especially among enlisted men. The findings are quite clear in revealing that, to the extent having civilian friends is of importance, it does have consequences in the expected direction, i.e., the more civilian friends, the more likely one is to have lower levels of pro-military values, including being more likely to see the level of military influence as adequate.

Residence off-post, however, does not have the predicted consequences. Of course, the indicator of off-post residence is quite crude. In addition, the data do not include any information on what happens when soldiers live off-post. For example, they may still interact primarily with other military personnel or their dependents and even car pool to the post for work or the commissary. In any case, the simple act of living off-post most of the time does not appear to modify the consequences of high levels of internal integration in terms of the measure of soldiers' satisfaction or dissatisfaction related to the critical issue of influence and decision making in national security policy.

The very groups of soldiers who are most satisfied with the fit between the military organization and themselves (an internal evaluation) are least content with the fit between the society and their profession in terms of civilian control of the policy process (an external evaluation).

My findings with regard to the consequences of the nonelite civil-military interface are mixed. I find that career military personnel are quite isolated from civilians in their friendship networks, although less so in terms of off-post residence. However, their isolation seems to have little independent effect on their values, at least in terms of internal or external evaluations.

What can be interpreted as successful integration of career-oriented soldiers, officers in particular, into the military as an organizational system including its values, may be problematic for the civil-military interface in terms of their seeing the existing levels of civilian control as not appropriate. However, I have here

neither established empirical consequences of those attitudes concerning civilian control for behavior of soldiers in the policy process, nor, based on these data, do I know in what ways, if any, civil-military relations among nonelite soldiers affect civil-military relations at the level of social institutions.³³

Both additional data and theory building are needed to develop a clear conception of what institution building processes,³⁴ if any, are needed for the All-Volunteer Force.

NOTES

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10. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. (New York: Free Press, 1960) and "Prologue" to Second Edition of The Professional Soldier (1971); Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man. (New York: Russell Sage, 1970) and "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural?" *Pacific Sociological Review* 16 (April 1973): 255-80.
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14. Segal, Senter, and Segal, op. cit.
15. Blair, op. cit.
16. Bachman, Blair and Segal, op. cit., Blair, op. cit.
17. Janowitz, "Military as 'Socio-Political' Problem," op. cit.
18. Segal, Blair, Newport, and Stephens, op. cit.
19. Segal, Senter, and Segal, op. cit.
20. Huntington, op. cit.
21. Janowitz, Professional Soldier, op. cit. and "Military as 'Socio-Political' Problem," op. cit.
22. Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972).
23. Bachman, Blair, and Segal, op. cit.
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26. cf. Edward O. Laumann, Bonds of Pluralism. (New York: Wiley, 1973); Segal, Senter, and Segal, op. cit.
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30. Segal, Blair, Newport, and Stephens, op. cit.
31. Op. cit.
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